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DISCUSSION
by Wilbur L. Fugate*
T IS A stimulating experience today to participate in this conference
on the extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws and
Canada's response thereto. I have spent a considerable time over the years on
this subject of extraterritoriality and it seems to become a more current topic
every day.
When I was in the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of
Justice, we had a very active and satisfactory liaison with the Office of the
Director of Investigations under the Combines Investigation Act, the Director
then being Mr. D.H.W. Henry, now Justice Henry of the Ontario Supreme
Court.
At that time it was our custom to meet very often with officials of the
Canadian Combines Branch, and to discuss as fully as possible our cases and
investigations and the impact any of them might have upon Canada. The
Combines Branch was equally frank. It was my pleasure to deal with Mr.
Henry, with Mr. Davidson who has already spoken to you, and with Mr.
Quinlan, now Chairman of the Restrictive Practices Commission. These
meetings, insofar as they concerned policy issues which either government
considered important to it, always included representatives of our State
Department and of the Canadian External Affairs Department. I am pleased
that discussions of this kind are continuing or have resumed and, particularly,
that they have involved policy-making officials of both governments.
I do not know whether the current conflicts in antitrust between the two
countries with respect to uranium and potash indicate that there was some
breakdown in this liaison or whether the issues raised were of such conse-
quence that friction could not be avoided in any case. One important aspect
of the discussions as they were conducted some years ago was that emphasis
was placed upon advance notice and consultation as to what each party in-
tended to do, and this resulted in a softening of any repercussions from the
action of one country affecting the important interests of the other country.
In some instances action by the United States was delayed or the manner of
taking it was changed, or the Canadian government itself determined to
remedy the antitrust problems which were raised.
There appears to be agreement between Mr. Baker and Mr. Davidson
with respect to the salutary influence of United States antitrust cases upon
Canadian interests. I am sure that this agreement on the part of Mr. Davidson
is not entirely shared, however, throughout the Canadian government or even
by some other departments of the United States Government. It may be that
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there will be, on occasion, conflicts in policy which cannot be accommodated
through consultation between the antitrust authorities. It may be that some
conflicts cannot even be solved by the diplomatic means.
Fortunately, differences in policy on antitrust have been exceedingly rare.
There was the so-called Radio Patents decision which prompted the first at-
tempt to create a consultation procedure between the United States and
Canada. I do not believe that the outcome of that case seriously injured
Canadian interests. Before that, there was the divestiture decree in a United
States antitrust case involving the Canadian company CIL, which had been
held jointly by two competitors, the American Dupont Company and the
British Imperial Chemical Industries. Again, I believe that CIL has pros-
pered despite the change of ownership required by the decree.
Such cases however, have occasioned an understandable amount of fric-
tion between the two countries. The potash cases and the Department of
Justice grand jury uranium investigation are current matters which have pro-
voked considerable reaction in Canada. I do not know how much discussion
preceded the institution by the Department of Justice of the potash cases and
its decision to begin the uranium gand jury investigation, but such matters
would appear to be covered by the United States-Canada understanding. It
is of course essential to have full discussion before the institution of suits by
the United States Department of Justice. This is not the entire answer since
the uranium cartel was brought to public attention by private suits, par-
ticularly the suit by utility companies against the Westinghouse Company in
the United States.
I agree with Mr. Baker that if a country has decided upon some interna-
tional arrangement which the United States would term an international
cartel, and which might be prohibited by United States law, it avoids an-
titrust problems for the country to make such an international arrangement
part of its own policy and to affirmatively mandate its implementation. Com-
modity agreements are prime examples of the fact that governments do have
agreements with respect to production and price which, in absence of govern-
mental approval and implementation, would probably run afoul of United
States and other countries' antitrust laws.
It is the rule under the United States antitrust law that a foreign govern-
ment must require anticompetitive action rather than merely approve such
action for there to be any relief for private companies engaging in the activity
in question. The usual rule for an exemption also is that the activity must
take place within the boundaries of the country requiring it. An exception to
this rule in the United States was established by the Occidental Petroleum
case, in which Venezuela clearly advised American companies that oil pro-
duced in Venezuela should not be sold to certain United States outlets which
were outside Venezuela. The reasoning of the United States court in this case,
however,, was that if the companies did not abide by the Venezuelan order,
the trade in question between the United States and Venezuela would have
become non-existent.
To conclude, I believe that the interests of the United States and Canada
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in commercial matters are very much the same. The United States should
consider that its actions may have a disproportionate effect upon the Cana-
dian economy; it should be very careful to fully respect Canada's sovereignty.
I believe also that the antitrust policies of the two countries are very parallel.
I suggest that antitrust consultation should be emphasized, as indeed it is at
this time, and that the two countries should mutually consider a balancing of
their respective important national interests whenever antitrust action is con-
templated.
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